Commentary - (2022) Volume 12, Issue 12
Received: 01-Dec-2022, Manuscript No. jmcj-23-86498;
Editor assigned: 03-Dec-2022, Pre QC No. P-86498;
Reviewed: 15-Dec-2022, QC No. Q-86498;
Revised: 20-Dec-2022, Manuscript No. R-86498;
Published:
27-Dec-2022
, DOI: 10.37421/2165-7912.2022.12.500
Citation: Falconieri, Rafael. “Monotony in the Sports League Broadcasting Revenue Division.” J Mass Communicat Journalism 12(2022): 500.
Copyright: © 2022 Falconieri R. This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited.
In this paper, we will concentrate on a significant aspect of the sports industry: broadcasting. It is estimated that 3.2 billion people watched the Olympic Summer Games in 2016, and 3.572 billion people watched the final round of the 2018 FIFA World Cup (the majority of the world's population was over the age of four). During the 2019 regular season, the National Football League games in the United States were watched by an average of 16.4 million people, while the Super Bowl was watched by an average of 99.9 million people. The sale of media rights and broadcasting rights is the most common source of revenue for sports organizations, followed by ticket sales, merchandise sales, and sponsorships. The NFL's national TV agreement with ESPN was worth 15.2 billion US dollars from 2014 to 2021 [1].
The distribution of the substantial proceeds from the sale of broadcasting rights is crucial to the management of sports organizations. The allocation process is based on the (broadcasting) audiences generated by games throughout the season, and this is the formal model that we introduced. That meant applying our hypothetical results to the Spanish football association and focusing on the issue from an observational and hypothetical perspective. Theoretically, we have also looked into additional facets of the problem. In fact, the main contribution of this paper is to look at the implications of axioms formalizing the monotonicity principle in that context, which had not been looked at in our previous work. In order to derive appropriate, we use the axiomatic approach in this paper [2].
Monotonicity is a general rule of equitable division that has been used for a long time in business and academic writing. It states that when the problem's underlying data change in a particular way, the solution should change. Monotony in its entirety: Consistent monotony: At the point when the competition's total crowd grows, Pairwise monotonicity occurs when all tournament games attract more spectators: Team similarity increases when more people watch the games that each team plays: Team monotony suffers when a particular team's games draw more spectators: monotony occurs when a particular team's game-day crowd grows while the rest of the crowd stays the same: when the number of people watching games that a team does not play decreases while the number of people watching those games stays the same [3].
Together with two additional fundamental adages, we will investigate the repercussions of each of the aforementioned sayings: Combining the monotonicity axioms with the aforementioned fundamental axioms yields our results, which are summarized below. These results provide characterizations for some of the preceding rules and families as well as several extensions of them. Equal treatment of equals (teams whose audiences are the same should receive the same treatment). To be more specific, we show that the uniform rule is the only rule that can satisfy aggregate monotonicity while the equal-split rule is the only one that can satisfy team monotonicity (additivity is not required for these results). Pairwise or overall monotonicity can only be satisfied by a rule that is a linear (but not necessarily convex) combination of the two rules. A rule can satisfy weak team monotonicity only if it is a linear (but not necessarily convex) combination of the uniform rule and the concede-anddivide strategy. Finally, a standard has proportional monotonicity if and only if it is a certain straight (but not really raised) mix of the same yield and-separation rule and split rule. We can deduce from the summary of the results that were just presented that monotonicity axioms are a useful tool for understanding the structure of the problem of sharing the revenue from broadcasting sports leagues. This is comparable to a number of related issues. Beyond the classical references for the use of monotonicity mentioned above, there have been recent instances in which these axioms have characterized rules (or families of rules) in related problems, such as the ones just mentioned, as well as bargaining problems, games, and others [4,5].
We have considered a number of monotonicity axioms for the broadcasting problem of sharing the revenues from broadcasting sports leagues. In other problem domains, monotonicity axioms proved to be extremely strong, sometimes even going against the most fundamental requirements of efficiency and fairness. Similar to this, Csató, 2019a, 2019b, and 2019c have recently argued that monotonicity in pairwise data-based models typically indicates impossibility. Despite the fact that they are not very strong enough to carry out impossibilities in our context7, we have produced a number of characterizations by combining them with two fundamental axioms-additivity and equal treatment of equals. The characterizations are used in two examples of single rules: the uniform rule and the equal-split rule.
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Journal of Mass Communication & Journalism received 205 citations as per Google Scholar report
